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Abstract. Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) that are being increasingly deployed in communities
and public places provide a relatively stable routing infrastructure and can be used for diverse carrier-
managed services. As a particular example we consider the scenario where a mobile device initially
registered for the use with one wireless network (its home network) moves to the area covered by
another network inside the same mesh. The goal is to establish a secure access to the home network
using the infrastructure of the mesh.
Classical mechanisms such as VPNs can protect end-to-end communication between the mobile
device and its home network while remaining transparent to the routing infrastructure. In WMNs
this transparency can be misused for packet injection leading to the unnecessary consumption of
the communication bandwidth. This may have negative impact on the cooperation of mesh routers
which is essential for the connection establishment.
In this paper we describe how to establish remote connections inside WMNs while guaranteeing
secure end-to-end communication between the mobile device and its home network and secure
transmission of the corresponding packets along the underlying multi-hop path. Our solution is a
provably secure, yet lightweight and round-optimal remote network access protocol in which inter-
mediate mesh routers are considered to be part of the security architecture. We also sketch some
ideas on the practical realization of the protocol using known standards and mention extensions with
regard to forward secrecy, anonymity and accounting.
1 Introduction and Motivation
The increasing deployment of wireless networks in urban areas set up in private households and in public
places offers high potential for ubiquitous communication to mobile clients. A promising approach for
combining the power of different wireless networks, possibly under distinct administrative control, while
expanding their overall coverage area is the composition into a wireless mesh network (WMN) through
the deployment of dynamic routing protocols such as AODV [24], DSR [18], LQSR [13]. In this way
a WMN consists of individual nodes (routers) which communicate with each other over wireless links
in a multi-hop fashion. Many current WMNs are based on WLAN standards (IEEE 802.11a/b/g) so that
mesh routing is performed at the network layer. A more efficient WMN infrastructure with mesh routing
at the link layer is currently being specified within IEEE 802.11s. In contrast to a more general form of
ad-hoc networks WMNs enjoy static topology with mostly stable routing infrastructure. This infrastruc-
ture allows for various carrier-managed services, which may also apply amongst wireless networks that
compose the same mesh. One of them is the remote network access.
A typical urban WMN connects not only residential networks but also networks of institutions of
public interest such as civil administration, police station, doctor’s office/surgery, etc. Such networks
(which we refer to as home networks) can be accessed by employees through the mobile devices ini-
tialized for this purpose while being in the proximity of the corresponding access points. On the other
hand, it is desirable to allow remote access to these networks from locations covered by other wireless
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networks, which are still part of the same mesh. For example, doctors visiting patients at home or em-
ployees of a local health authority while inspecting restaurants in the neighborhood may wish to remotely
access databases and application servers in their institutions in order to perform tasks that they would
usually do within their native environment. Observe that these scenarios do not assume high mobility of
the clients and the established WMN routing path will likely remain unchanged for the whole duration
of the session.
An important security goal of a remote network access protocol is to protect the end-to-end commu-
nication between the device and its home network, in particular to protect the application content from
being eavesdropped or modified during its transmission. Another significant problem in WMNs is that
intermediate mesh routers are under different administrative control and that their cooperation is cru-
cial for the establishment and maintenance of the remote session. A promising approach to increase this
cooperation and so improve the robustness of the remote connection is to deploy additional incentive
mechanisms [9], e.g. let the home network reimburse the cooperating mesh routers for resources that
they allocate to establish and maintain the remote session. It is clear that traditional end-to-end security
mechanisms (such as IPsec VPNs) that are transparent to the underlying routing infrastructure do not
adequately reflect the additional security needs of cooperating mesh routers along the remote path.
1.1 Refining End-to-End Protection with the Concept of Path Security
With traditional authentication and key establishment protocols for end-to-end security the mobile device
and its home network can compute the secret end-to-end key for the session after authenticating each
other. This key is sufficient to protect the application data exchanged between the device and its remotely
accessed home network.
Nevertheless, the communication nature of WMNs allows the adversary to inject packets into the
wireless channel and although the deployed end-to-end protection will prevent the end points from ac-
cepting such rogue packets the cooperating mesh routers on the path will not be able to distinguish them
from the “good” packets originated by the end points. As a consequence, mesh routers will forward rogue
packets, thus wasting their own (costly) communication resources. This illustrates the need of stronger
protection mechanisms that would ensure authentication at the packet level as well.
We observe that the above problem comes from the missing binding between the end-to-end protected
(application) channel and the underlying multi-hop WMN channel. In this work we investigate how to
efficiently bind these independent channels for the duration of the remote session.1 Our solution is to
refine the traditional concept of end-to-end security by achieving similar goals for the underlying path
(path security). More precisely, we provide all entities involved into the remote session, i.e. the mobile
device, its home network, and intermediate mesh routers, with the ability to compute an additional path
key as a by-product of an authentication protocol for the establishment of the end-to-end protected remote
connection. In order to ensure security of this path key we also require authentication of intermediate
mesh routers and the end points during the execution of this protocol. In this way the application content
exchanged between the mobile device and its home network can be still protected using the end-to-
end key whereas the path key will protect the multi-hop transmission of corresponding packets along
the established path, thus thwarting possible resource consumption attacks on the mesh routers. The
existence of the path key shared amongst the end points and the mesh routers may also offer further
application-specific benefits once the remote connection is established. For example, it can be used to
protect control messages used in quality-of-service (QoS) mechanisms in some real-time applications
such as VoIP.
1 We remark that for networks with frequent route updates and for applications with highly mobile clients it would
be rather undesirable to bind the application session to the underlying routing path. Yet, inside WMNs where the
routes are rather stable and for remote sessions in which the clients remain static (as in our application examples)
this binding is a promising practical method to provide stronger security guarantees for the remote connection.
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1.2 Related Work
The security architecture for WLANs specified in IEEE 802.11i provides an authenticated network ac-
cess of a mobile device to a wireless network with additional computation of a session key. The authenti-
cation can be based on pre-shared keys (WPA, WPA2) or use the IEEE 802.1X specification based on the
EAP framework [2], the latter is often used in combination with a RADIUS authentication server. How-
ever, IEEE 802.11i has been designed for single-hop connections and is, therefore, not directly applicable
for WMNs. A direct extension of IEEE 802.11i to a multi-hop scenario has been described in [22]. Fur-
ther, with PANA [14] there exists an authentication carrying protocol that can encapsulate EAP messages
and transmit them in a multi-hop fashion across WMNs as described in [10, 19]. In this way any EAP
method, e.g. using username/passwords [11], shared keys [7], or public-key certificates [17, 25], can
be applied. Alternatively, end-to-end security between the mobile client and its home network can be
established using IPsec VPN tunnels.
The previously mentioned solutions, especially using current EAP methods, have been designed to
achieve the classical end-to-end security goals. Therefore, they do not include any mechanisms that
would be sufficient for the requirements of path security. In particular, they offer no protection against
the impersonation of mesh routers and resource consumption attacks. On the other hand, with LHAP [29]
there exists a light-weight authentication protocol (based on one-way hash functions) that can be used
to obtain packet authentication in multi-hop communication scenarios. But LHAP was not designed to
establish an end-to-end secure connection which is inherent to our setting. Moreover, LHAP does not
offer mutual authentication between the mesh routers and the accessed home network.
Finally, we mention that the notion of path authentication is frequently used in the literature on rout-
ing protocols, especially in the context of secure route updates and announcements [26–28]. However,
this process is oblivious to the actual application and is therefore not applicable in our case.
1.3 Organization
In Section 2 we describe our remote network access protocol, called SERENA, that simultaneously achieves
the requirements of end-to-end and path security through the corresponding binding of the application
channel to the underlying mesh path. In addition we provide some remarks on its efficiency and describe
ideas on how to realize the protocol in practice using known authentication standards. In Section 3 we
specify a single formal model for a secure remote network access protocol inside the wireless mesh cap-
turing the mutual authentication and key establishment goals within the concepts of end-to-end and path
security. The concept of path security is thereby modeled through the consideration of mesh routers as
an inherent part of the security architecture. We utilize the classical modeling techniques from [5] which
we extend to the multi-hop setting of WMNs. Following the model, in Section 4 we formally argue on
the security of our protocol. Finally, in Section 5 we briefly discuss some further extensions regarding
forward secrecy of the computed keys, anonymity of the mobile client with respect to the mesh network
infrastructure, and accounting between the networks.
2 SERENA: A Single Protocol for End-to-End and Path Security
Here we introduce SERENA — our protocol for the secure remote access of the mobile deviceM to its
wireless home networkH using intermediate mesh routers {Ri}i, all belonging to the same mesh.
2.1 Notations and Building Blocks
SERENA uses several (well-known) cryptographic primitives:
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– A pseudo-random function PRF : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ which is used for the purpose of key
derivation and can be realized using block-ciphers or keyed one-way hash functions. By AdvprfPRF(κ)
we denote the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries (running within time κ) in distinguish-
ing the outputs of PRF from those of a random function better than by a random guess. We use PRF
to derive various keys and sometimes we assume that the output is split in two parts, e.g. PRF with
expansion such as the one defined within the TLS standard and analyzed in [15] can be used for this
purpose.
– An asymmetric encryption scheme satisfying the property of indistinguishability under (adaptive)
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) whose encryption and decryption operations are denoted
Enc and Dec, respectively. By Advind-cca2(Enc,Dec)(κ) we denote the maximum advantage over all PPT
adversaries (running within time κ) in breaking the IND-CCA2 property of (Enc, Dec) better than by
a random guess; The property of IND-CCA2 security is for example preserved in several encryption
schemes including RSA-OAEP [16] and DHIES [1].
– A digital signature scheme with existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks (EUF-
CMA) whose signing and verification operations are denoted Sig and Ver, respectively. By Succeuf-cma(Sig,Ver)(κ)
we denote the maximum success probability over all PPT adversaries (running within time κ) given
access to the signing oracle in finding a forgery; examples of such schemes include DSS [23] and
PSS [6].
– A sequential aggregate signature scheme with existential unforgeability under chosen message at-
tacks (EUF-CMA) whose aggregate signing and verification operations are denoted ASig and AVer,
respectively. By Succeuf-cma(ASig,AVer)(κ) we denote the maximum success probability over all PPT adver-
saries (running within time κ) given access to the aggregate signing oracle of an uncorrupted signer
in finding an aggregate signature forgery; for formal security definitions and construction examples
we refer to [20, 21].
– A message authentication code function MAC with weak unforgeability against chosen message at-
tacks (WUF-CMA) [4], e.g., the popular function HMAC [3] can be used for this purpose. By
Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ) we denote the maximum success probability over all PPT adversaries (running within
time κ) given access to the MAC oracle in finding a MAC forgery.
2.2 Initialization of SERENA
We assume that prior to the execution of Π the involved parties are in possession of the following
long-lived keys: LLi of each mesh router Ri consists of a private/public signature/verification key
pair (ski, vki) which is suitable for the deployed aggregate signature scheme (ASig, AVer) and a de-
cryption/encryption key pair (dki, eki); LLH consists of a private/public signature/verification key pair
(skH, vkH) which is suitable for the digital signature scheme (Sig, Ver) and a pair (M, (kM,αM))
where (kM, αM) is a high-entropy secret key consisting of a PRF key kM and a MAC key αM shared
with the hostedM; LLM consists of (kM, αM). In practice it is sufficient for H andM to share kM
and derive the corresponding MAC key αM as PRFkM(l) for some publicly fixed label l. Further, we as-
sume that the public keys of all routers of the same mesh (including the home network H) are known.
Note that due to the static infrastructure of wireless mesh networks this assumption is feasible (this is
clearly in contrast to (dynamic) ad-hoc networks where such assumptions are undesirable).
2.3 Lightweight SERENA — Specification
The detailed specification of lightweight SERENA is illustrated in Figure 1. For the clarity of presenta-
tion we assume that the path between M and H through the mesh network is given by a sequence of
intermediate mesh routers R1, . . . ,Rn whereby each Ri knows the next hop router Ri+1 as a result of
underlying routing mechanism. In the following we highlight how SERENA merges end-to-end protection
with path security.
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SERENA uses distinct labels li, i = 1,. . .,4, which are fixed in advance, as input to PRF for the
derivation of different keys. Also, during the execution each party P ∈ {M, {Ri}i,H} computes own
session id sidP as a concatenated bit stringM|rM|{Ri|ri}i|H|rH where rP denotes a random nonce
chosen by P . For this parties use auxiliary variables usid and dsid which contain respective substrings
of concatenated identities and nonces, depending on the position of P in the path.
Both H andM derive their end-to-end key Ke using the shared key kM and their session ids. The
equality of their session ids is ensured upon the verification of the corresponding MAC values µH and
µM, whereby bits 0 and 1 are used to guarantee that µH 6= µM.
The difficult part of the protocol from the security point of view is the computation of the path key
Kp and the mutual authentication between H and each mesh router Ri. The main idea is to let the
home network choose the secret key material k′p which will be securely transported through the mesh
network. Since the encryption of k′p by H for each router Ri would lead to the linear increase of the
ciphertext we apply a better approach — hop-by-hop re-encryption, i.e. k′p originally encrypted by H
forRn is re-encrypted byRn forRn−1 and so on. The challenge of such re-encryption is to allow each
Ri to independently verify that decrypted k′p is essentially the same as the one originally sent by H, i.e.
without trusting the next-hop router. The trick is to use the PRF output θp, which is never sent but is
signed within σH, which in turn is forwarded along the mesh path until it reachesR1. The verification of
this σH implicitly requires each Ri to recompute θp and also to hold the same session id. Since θp and
kp (used to derive the path key Kp) are both derived from k′p, the validity of the signature σH verified
by Ri immediately implies the equality of k′p received by Ri from Ri+1 and the original k′p sent by H.
Since the validity of σH also implies that Ri and H share the same session id, it is easy to see that at
the end of the protocol each mesh router computes the same path key. At the same time the validity of
σH is used for the authentication of H towards each Ri. The mobile deviceM computes the same path
key since it can derive k′p directly using kM. The authentication of each Ri towards H is performed
via the aggregate signature σ¯1..n. Each Ri contributes to the computation of this signature by executing
the ASig algorithm using its own signing key ski, the aggregate signature σ¯1..i−1 previously received
from Ri−1, and the message sidi|θp|µM. The successful verification of σ¯1..n by H authenticates the
established path and ensuresH that the mesh routers {Ri}i hold the same session id and the path key as
H.
Note that during the protocol execution parties perform various checks. We assume that if at some
point the corresponding check fails then the party immediately aborts. If parties do not abort then the
execution of SERENA was successful, meaning that from now on M can be granted access to H. In
practice,M will be assigned an IP address from the domain of H and treated by H as one of its native
devices.
2.4 Efficiency of SERENA
We stress that SERENA is lightweight in the sense that the mobile device M does not need to perform
any costly public-key operations. Hence, SERENA can also be used with performance-constraint devices
such as PDAs and smart phones provided they have a wireless IP interface. The public-key cryptogra-
phy is used in SERENA for the hop-by-hop re-encryption of k′p and the mutual authentication between
{Ri}i andH. On the other hand, hop-by-hop re-encryption and the use of aggregate signatures allows to
significantly reduce the (wireless) communication overhead which is the main bottleneck in WMNs (in
contrast to the usually rich computation resources available to the mesh routers). Note also that SERENA
requires three communication rounds — by one round we mean a complete message flow betweenM
andH routed through {Ri}i, which is optimal to achieve mutual authentication (with key confirmation)
based on the deployed challenge-response technique.
Remark 1. The modularity of SERENA allows to completely remove public-key operations (and the cor-
responding long-lived keys) resulting in a more efficient protocol that would nevertheless still ensure the
6 Mark Manulis
Mobile DeviceM
{(kM, αM)}
Mesh RoutersR1, . . . ,Rn
eachRi has
{(ski, vki), (dki, eki)}
Home NetworkH
{(skH, vkH), (M, (kM, αM))}
rM ∈r {0, 1}κ;
usidM :=M|rM
−
usidM|H−−−−−−→
ri ∈r {0, 1}κ
usidi := usidi−1|Ri|ri
SEND usidi toRi+1
−−−− usidn−−−−−−−−−−→
rH ∈r {0, 1}κ
sidH := usidn|H|rH
k′p := PRFkM(l1|sidH)
kp|θp := PRFk′p(l2|sidH)
χn := Encekn(k
′
p)
µH := MACαM(0|sidH)
σH := SigskH(sidH|θp|µH)
dsidH := H|rH
←−
dsidH|χn|µH|σH−−−−−−−−−−−−
sidi := usidi|dsidi+1
k′p := Decdki(χi+1)
kp|θp := PRFk′p(l2|sidi)
CHECK σH
χi−1 := Enceki−1(k
′
p)
dsidi := Ri|ri|dsidi+1
SEND dsidi|χi−1|µH|σH to
Ri−1
←−
dsid1|µH−−−−−−
sidM := usidM|dsid1
CHECK µH
k′p := PRFkM(l1|sidM)
kp|αp := PRFk′p(l2|sidM)
Kp := PRFkp(l3|sidM)
Ke := PRFkM(l4|sidM)
µM := MACαM(1|sidM)
ACCEPT
−
µM−−−−−−−→
σ¯1..i :=
ASigski(σ¯1..i−1, sidi|θp|µM)
SEND µM|σ¯1..i toRi+1
Kp := PRFkp(l3|sidi)
ACCEPT
−−−−
µM|σ¯1..n−−−−−−−−−−→
CHECK µM and σ¯1..n
Kp := PRFkp(l3|sidH)
Ke := PRFkM(l4|sidH)
ACCEPT
Fig. 1. Execution of lightweight SERENA protocol between M, R1, . . . ,Rn, and H. Computations of
intermediate mesh routers are described per eachRi and are triggered upon the delivery of the expected
message fromRi−1 orRi+1; indices i = 0 and i = n+ 1 refer toM andH, respectively.
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traditional end-to-end security betweenM and H. However, this modification will no longer allow for
a secure computation of the path key and the mutual authentication between the home network and the
mesh routers.
2.5 Implementation of SERENA using Authentication Standards
In order to realize SERENA with existing authentication standards we have to consider the following
connection links: the wireless link betweenM and R1 and the wireless multi-hop path from R1 to H
over the last-hop routerRn.
We assume that R1 combines the routing functionality with that of an access point for M. Prior
to the execution of SERENA the mobile device M would be typically connected to R1 at the data link
layer, which is preferable as no IP assignment forM is necessary in this case. Then, on the link between
M and R1 our protocol can be implemented as a new EAP method within IEEE 802.1X framework.
Along the multi-hop path from R1 to H (which combines the functionality of a mesh router and the
authentication/application server) we can further implement SERENA using encapsulated EAP messages
within an appropriate carrying protocol, for example with PANA [14].
Once SERENA is successfully executed H can allocate an IP address for M (either as a parameter
within SERENA or via DHCP). This would complete the establishment of a secure remote network access
betweenM and H. In the course of subsequent communication betweenM and H intermediate mesh
routersR1, . . . ,Rn can continue acting as layer 2 bridges until the session is finished.
The end-to-end protection of the session content between M and H can be achieved traditionally
using the Authentication Header (AH) or Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) mechanisms of IPsec
in the tunnel mode, whereby the session key for this should be derived from Ke. The additional packet
protection that should prevent resource consumption attacks via packet injection can be also performed
using AH and ESP, however, this time in the transport mode and using the session key derived from Kp.
3 Security Model
Our model extends the two-party model from [5] towards the multi-hop communication nature of WMNs
and the additional path security goals.
3.1 Participants and Communication
Mobile Device and Home Network The goal of the protocol, denoted abstractly by Π , is to establish
a secure remote network access between the mobile deviceM and its wireless home network H. The
identity M is assumed to be unique within H. Both M and H hold their corresponding long-lived
keys LLM and LLH. By κ ∈ N we denote the security parameter such that all secrets used in Π are
polynomially bounded in κ.
Intermediate Mesh Routers We assume that H is part of the WMN and that the connection between
M and H will be established along a multi-hop path consisting of some intermediate WMN routers
R1, . . . ,Rn. For the ease of presentation, we consider R1 as the first-hop router forM and Rn as the
last-hop router before H. Typically, such route will be defined in the connection establishment phase by
the underlying routing protocol. Each intermediate mesh routerRi has a long-lived key LLi.
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Instances, Sessions, Partnering, Session Keys In order to model participation of M, H, and {Ri}i
in distinct sessions of Π we consider an unlimited number of instances: By [P, s] we denote the s-th
instance of P ∈ {M,H, {Ri}i} where s ∈ N. Each instance [P, s] is initialized with the party’s long-
lived key and invoked for one session which will be identified through a unique (public) session id sidsP .
Instances ofM,H and {Ri}i with identical session ids are partnered, i.e. participate in the same session.
Prior to the termination of Π an instance [P, s] accepts if the protocol execution was successful
(from the perspective of [P, s]) or aborts. A mesh router Ri accepts after it successfully authenticates
H and computes the session path key Kp ∈ {0, 1}κ; the home network H accepts after it successfully
authenticates the mobile device and the intermediate mesh routers on the path, and computes the session
end-to-end key Ke ∈ {0, 1}κ (in addition to Kp); and the mobile deviceM accepts after it successfully
authenticatesH and computes Ke and Kp.
3.2 Adversary and Security Definitions
Adversarial Model Adversary A is a PPT machine with complete control over the communication. It
can mount attacks via the following set of queries:
- Invoke(P,m): This is the protocol invocation query for some entity P ∈ {M,H, {Ri}i}. In re-
sponse, a new instance [P, s] is created and its first protocol message is given to A. The optional
input m indicates the message expected by the instance to start the execution; for the initiator of the
protocol m is supposed to be empty.
- Send(P, s,m): This query models communication control by A and contains a message m which
should be delivered to the s-th instance of P ∈ {M,H, {Ri}i}. In response,A receives the outgoing
message of [P, s], or an empty string if [P, s] terminates having processed m.
- Corrupt(P ): This query models corruptions of P ∈ {M,H, {Ri}i}. In response, A receives LLP .
- Reveal_Ke(P, s): This query models independence of end-to-end keys computed by the instances
of P ∈ {M,H} in different sessions. In response, A is given Ke held by the instance; the query is
answered only if [P, s] has accepted.
- Reveal_Kp(P, s): This query models independence of path keys computed by the instances of P ∈
{M,H, {Ri}i} in different sessions. In response, A is given Kp held by the instance; the query is
answered only if [P, s] has accepted.
- Test_Ke(P, s): This query will be used to define the AKE-security of the end-to-end keyKe and can
be asked only for P ∈ {M,H}. It is answered only if [P, s] has accepted and the answer is based
on some secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} chosen in advance: If b = 1 then A is given Ke, otherwise a randomly
chosen value from {0, 1}κ.
- Test_Kp(P, s): This query will be used to define the AKE-security of the path key Kp and can be
asked for P ∈ {M,H, {Ri}i}. It is answered only if [P, s] has accepted and the answer is based on
some secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} chosen in advance: If b = 1 then A is given Kp, otherwise a randomly
chosen value from {0, 1}κ.
Definition 1 (Correctness). A protocol Π is correct if the invoked instances ofM, H, and {Ri}i ter-
minate having accepted and all of the following holds:M andH hold the same end-to-end key Ke;M,
H, and {Ri}i hold the same path key Kp.
End-to-End Security Our first definition is about mutual authentication between M and H. It also
ensures that partnered instances ofM and H accept holding the same end-to-end key Ke and the same
path key Kp.
Definition 2 (MA betweenM andH). Given a correct protocolΠ by Gamema-m-hΠ (A, κ) we denote the
interaction between the instances ofM, H and {Ri}i with a PPT adversary A that is allowed to query
Invoke, Send, Corrupt, Reveal_Ke, and Reveal_Kp. A wins if at some point during the interaction:
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(1) an uncorrupted instance ofM accepts but there is no uncorrupted partnered instance ofH, or
(2) an uncorrupted instance ofH accepts but there is no uncorrupted partnered instance ofM, or
(3) uncorrupted partnered instances ofM and H accept without holding the same session end-to-end
key Ke, or
(4) {Ri}i are uncorrupted and uncorrupted partnered instances ofM and H accept without holding
the same session path key Kp.
The maximum probability of this event over all adversaries (running in time κ) is denoted
Succma-m-hΠ (A, κ) = maxA |Pr[A wins in Gamema-m-hΠ (A, κ)]|.
Π provides mutual authentication betweenM andH if this probability is negligible in κ.
The secrecy of the established end-to-end keyKe is modeled through the classical notion of authenti-
cated key exchange (AKE) security adopted to our setting. Recall that the basic idea behind AKE-security
is to require the indistinguishability of the key computed in some test session from some randomly cho-
sen value by any outsider adversary. Observe that in case of Ke we must allow the adversary to corrupt
the intermediate mesh routers {Ri}i also during the test session.
In order to define the AKE-security of Ke (denoted as e-AKE-security) we first specify the auxiliary
notion of e-freshness for the instances ofM andH. It provides conditions under whichA can be treated
as an outsider with respect to the test session for which it has to distinguish Ke.
Definition 3 (e-Freshness). In the execution of Π an instance [P, s] with P ∈ {M,H} is e-fresh if
none of the following holds:
– A asks Corrupt(P );
– IF P =M:A asks Reveal_Ke(M, s) after [M, s] has accepted or Reveal_Ke(H, t) after [H, t] has
accepted and [M, s] and [H, t] are partnered;
– IF P = H: A asks Reveal_Ke(H, s) after [H, s] has accepted or Reveal_Ke(M, t) after [M, t] has
accepted and [H, s] and [M, t] are partnered.
Definition 4 (e-AKE-Security). Given a correct protocol Π , a uniformly chosen bit b, and a PPT ad-
versary A with access to the queries Invoke, Send, Corrupt, Reveal_Ke, Reveal_Kp, and Test_Ke, by
Gamee-ake,bΠ (A, κ) we denote the following interaction between the instances ofM, H and {Ri}i with
A:
– A interacts with instances via queries;
– at some point A asks a Test_Ke query to an instance [P, s] which has accepted and is e-fresh (and
remains such by the end of the interaction);
– A continues interacting with instances and when A terminates, it outputs a bit, which is then set as
the output of the interaction.
A wins if the output of Gamee-ake,bΠ (A, κ) is identical to b. The maximum probability of the adversarial
advantage over the random guess of b, over all adversaries (running in time κ) is denoted
Adve-akeΠ (A, κ) = maxA |2 Pr[Gamee-ake,bΠ (A, κ) = b]− 1|.
If this advantage is negligible in κ then Π provides e-AKE-security.
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Path Security Here we formalize the additional path security requirements from Section 1.1. First, we
define mutual authentication between the home network H and each mesh router Ri on the path, which
also captures the equality of session path keys computed by H and each Ri. Note also that winning
conditions in this case require the instance of Ri to be uncorrupted, however, the adversary can still
corrupt any other Rj , j 6= i. This models attacks of malicious routers aiming to disrupt the mutual
authentication process and the computation of identical path keys between the (honest) intermediate
mesh routers and the home network.
Definition 5 (MA betweenH andRi). Given a correct protocol Π by Gamema-h-rΠ (A, κ) we denote the
interaction between the instances ofM, H and {Ri}i with a PPT adversary A that is allowed to query
Invoke, Send, Corrupt, Reveal_Ke, and Reveal_Kp. A wins if at some point during the interaction:
(1) an uncorrupted instance ofRi accepts but there is no uncorrupted partnered instance ofH, or
(2) an uncorrupted instance ofH accepts but there is no uncorrupted partnered instance ofRi, or
(3) M is uncorrupted and uncorrupted partnered instances of H and Ri accept without holding the
same session path key Kp.
The maximum probability of this event over all adversaries (running in time κ) is denoted
Succma-h-rΠ (A, κ) = maxA |Pr[A wins in Gamema-h-rΠ (A, κ)]|.
Π provides mutual authentication betweenH andRi if this probability is negligible in κ.
Recall that the instances of participants are seen as partnered if they hold the same session ids. Hence,
if Π provides both the mutual authentication betweenM andH and the mutual authentication between
H and eachRi then the execution of Π in whichH accepts implies the partnering for the corresponding
instances ofM and eachRi, which in turn implies that the instances ofM, {Ri}i, andH computed the
same Kp.
Further, we model the AKE-security of the path keyKp (denoted p-AKE-security) modeled using the
auxiliary notion of p-freshness that specifies the conditions under which A can be treated as an outsider
with respect to the test session for which it has to distinguish Kp.
Definition 6 (p-Freshness). In the execution of Π an instance [P, s] with P ∈ {M,H, {Ri}i} is p-
fresh if none of the following holds:
– A asks Corrupt(P );
– IF P = M: A asks Reveal_Kp(M, s) after [M, s] has accepted or Reveal_Kp(P ′, t) for P ′ ∈
{H, {Ri}i} after [P ′, t] has accepted and [M, s] and [P ′, t] are partnered;
– IF P = H: A asks Reveal_Kp(H, s) after [H, s] has accepted or Reveal_Kp(P ′, t) for P ′ ∈
{M, {Ri}i} after [P ′, t] has accepted and [H, s] and [P ′, t] are partnered;
– IF P = Ri: A asks Reveal_Kp(Ri, s) after [Ri, s] has accepted or Reveal_Kp(P ′, t) for P ′ ∈
{M,H, {Rj}j 6=i} after [P ′, t] has accepted and [Ri, s] and [P ′, t] are partnered.
Definition 7 (p-AKE-Security). Given a correct protocol Π , a uniformly chosen bit b, and a PPT ad-
versary A with access to the queries Invoke, Send, Corrupt, Reveal_Ke, Reveal_Kp, and Test_Kp, by
Gamep-ake,bΠ (A, κ) we denote the following interaction between the instances ofM, H and {Ri}i with
A:
– A interacts with instances via queries;
– at some point A asks a Test_Kp query to an instance [P, s] which has accepted and is p-fresh (and
remains such by the end of the interaction);
– A continues interacting with instances and when A terminates, it outputs a bit, which is then set as
the output of the interaction.
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A wins if the output of Gamep-ake,bΠ (A, κ) is identical to b. The maximum probability of the adversarial
advantage over the random guess of b, over all adversaries (running in time κ) is denoted
Advp-akeΠ (A, κ) = maxA |2 Pr[Gamep-ake,bΠ (A, κ) = b]− 1|.
If this advantage is negligible in κ then Π provides p-AKE-security.
4 Security Analysis of SERENA
The following theorems show that SERENA provides both end-to-end and path security. By q we denote
the total number of the invoked sessions.
Theorem 1 (MA betweenM andH). Given a WUF-CMA secure MAC the protocol SERENA specified in
Figure 1 provides mutual authentication between the participating mobile device and its home network
in the sense of Definition 2, and
Succma-m-hSERENA (κ) ≤
2q2
2κ
+ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ).
Proof. In our proofs we apply the meanwhile classical proving technique from [?]. Here we construct
a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, . . . , 2 and denote by Winma-m-hi the event that an adversary A breaks
the mutual authentication between M and H in game Gi, i.e., wins in the corresponding interaction
as described in Definition 2. Note that A is allowed to corrupt any mesh router Ri for the winning
conditions (1) – (3), but not for (4).
Game G0. [Real protocol] This is the real Gamema-m-hSERENA (κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT
adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the participating M, H, and {Ri}i according to the protocol
specification and answers all queries of A.
Game G1. [Collisions for chosen nonces rM and rH] In this game the simulation aborts if during
the interaction the simulator chooses the same random nonce rM resp. rH on behalf ofM resp. H in
two different protocol sessions. Considering the collision probability for the same nonce to be chosen
twice we obtain |Pr[Winma-m-h
1
]− Pr[Winma-m-h
0
]| ≤ 2q22κ .
Note that since in SERENA each participant computes own session id as a concatenated stringM|rM|
{Ri|ri}i|H|rH this game rules out the occurrence of the same session ids computed by the instances of
M and H in two different sessions, regardless of the chosen {ri}i. Thus, this game implies that sidM
and sidH remain unique for each invoked session.
Game G2. [MAC forgeries for µH and µM] This game is identical to Game G1 with the only ex-
ception that ∆ fails if A asks a Send query to an instance of M containing a valid MAC value µH not
previously output by an instance of H or a Send query to an instance of H containing a valid µM not
previously output by an instance ofM.
The probability that the simulation aborts can be upper-bounded through the probability of forging
any of the both MAC values. To see this, consider ∆ given access to the MAC oracle. ∆ simulates the
execution of SERENA according to the specification except that it computes µH and µM through the
corresponding oracle calls. In case that the simulation aborts ∆ is in possession of a valid MAC value
(representing either µH or µM) which was not obtained through any previous oracle call. Hence, ∆ can
easily output it as a forgery. This implies |Pr[Winma-m-h
2
]− Pr[Winma-m-h
1
]| ≤ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ).
Having eliminated possible forgeries for µH and µM we note that since these MAC values are com-
puted over the session ids sidH and sidM, respectively (that according to the previous game are unique
for each new session) this game rules out any successful replay attacks using µH and µM. Therefore,
any successful verification of µH by an instance of M and of µM by an instance of H implies that
there are two instances ofM and H that hold the same session ids, and are, therefore partnered. Since
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verification of µH and µM is the necessary requirement for the acceptance of the instances ofM and
H in SERENA we follow that this game ensures mutual authentication betweenM and H and excludes
attacks by which A can win based on conditions (1) and (2).
Further, we focus on the attacks based on conditions (3) and (4). Since the session end-to-end
key Ke is derived by the instances of M and H in a deterministic way as PRFkM(l4, sidM) and
PRFkM(l4, sidH), respectively, it follows that if any two partnered instances of M and H accept then
they hold identical values for Ke, i.e. the probability of A to win in this game through condition 3 is 0.
Finally, we observe that if any two partnered instances ofM and H accept then they hold the path key
Kp, which is computed in a deterministic way as PRFkp(l3, sidM) and PRFkp(l3, sidH), respectively.
Hence, the probability thatA wins in this game through condition 4, is upper-bounded by the probability
that these partnered instances have computed different values for the key material kp. However, kp is
derived in two deterministic steps using the shared secret kM, i.e.M computes k′p := PRFkM(l1, sidM)
followed by kp|αp := PRFk′p(l1, sidM) whereas H computes k′p := PRFkM(l1, sidH) followed by
kp|αp := PRFk′p(l1, sidH). This implies that the probability of A winning in this game through condi-
tion 4 is also 0. Summing up the discussed probabilities of A to win in this game based on conditions 3
and 4 we obtain Pr[Winma-m-h
2
] = 0. Combining with the previous equations, we conclude the proof.
Theorem 2 (e-AKE). Given a WUF-CMA secure MAC and a pseudo-random PRF the protocol SERENA
specified in Figure 1 provides e-AKE-security in the sense of Definition 4, and
Adve-akeSERENA(κ) ≤
4q2
2κ
+ 4Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ) + 4qAdv
prf
PRF(κ).
Proof. As in the previous proof we construct a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, . . . , 4 and denote by
Wine-akei the event that A breaks the e-AKE-security of SERENA in game Gi, i.e., wins in the corre-
sponding interaction as described in Definition 4.
Game G0. [Real protocol] This is the real Gamee-akeSERENA(κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT
adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the participating M, H, and {Ri}i according to the protocol
specification and answers all queries of A. Recall, that the Test_Ke query is asked by A to an e-fresh
instance of eitherM orH which has previously accepted. In order to preventA from active participation
on behalf of eitherM or H we first exclude possible impersonation attacks against any of these parties.
For this we can re-use gamesG1 andG2 from the proof of Theorem 1.
Game G1. [Collisions for nonces rM and rH] The simulation in this game aborts (and the output
bit of the interaction is set at random) if the same random nonce rM (or rH) is chosen by ∆ on behalf
ofM (orH) in two different protocol sessions, implying
|Pr[Wine-ake
1
]− Pr[Wine-ake
0
]| ≤ 2q
2
2κ
. (1)
Game G2. [MAC forgeries for µH and µM] The simulation in this game aborts (and the output bit
of the interaction is set at random) if A asks as part of its Send query toM (or to H) a valid MAC value
µH (or µM) which was not previously output by an instance ofH (orM), so that
|Pr[Wine-ake
2
]− Pr[Wine-ake
1
]| ≤ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ). (2)
The elimination of possible forgeries and replay attacks for µH and µM implies that any accepting
e-fresh instance ofM (orH) has a partnered instance ofH (orM) which is also e-fresh.
Game G3. [Pseudo-randomness of k′p] This game is identical to Game G2 except that ∆ in each
session chooses the value for k′p at random on behalf of an instance of H instead of deriving it via PRF
and uses the same value in the simulation of the corresponding partnered instance of M (to preserve
consistency). Following the classical reductionist argument we obtain
|Pr[Wine-ake
3
]− Pr[Wine-ake
2
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (3)
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Note that this game ensures independence between k′p (and consequently between all secrets that are
derived using k′p such as kp, αp, and the path key Kp) and the shared key kM (used to derive the end-
to-end key Ke). We remark that the randomly chosen value for k′p in this game will also be propagated
via hop-by-hop encryption across the mesh network in order to ensure consistency between the path key
computed by the possibly corrupted instances of {Ri}i and uncorrupted instances ofH andM.
Game G4. [Pseudo-randomness of Ke] This final game is identical to Game G3 except that ∆ in
each session choosesKe at random on behalf of an instance ofM instead of deriving it via PRF and uses
the same value in the simulation of the corresponding partnered instance ofH (to preserve consistency),
so that
|Pr[Wine-ake
4
]− Pr[Wine-ake
3
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (4)
This game implies that the answer given to A in response to its Test_Ke query to some e-fresh instance
ofM or H is a completely random value, regardless of the chosen bit b. Obviously, the probability of
A to win in this game is then given by the probability of a random guess, i.e. Pr[Wine-ake
4
] = 12 . The
combination of the above equations concludes the proof.
Theorem 3 (MA between H and Ri). Given EUF-CMA secure (Sig, Ver) and (ASig, AVer) the pro-
tocol SERENA specified in Figure 1 provides mutual authentication between each participating mesh
routerRi and the home networkH in the sense of Definition 5, and
Succma-h-rSERENA(κ) ≤
(n+ 1)q2
2κ
+ Succeuf-cma(Sig,Ver)(κ) + nSucc
euf-cma
(ASig,AVer)(κ).
Proof. Similar to the previous proofs we construct a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, . . . , 2 and denote
by Winma-h-ri the event that A breaks the mutual authentication between any Ri and H in gameGi, i.e.,
wins in the corresponding interaction as described in Definition 5. Note that A is allowed to corruptM
for the winning conditions (1) and (2), but not for (3).
Game G0. [Real protocol] This is the real Gamema-h-rSERENA(κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT
adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the participating M, H, and {Ri}i according to the protocol
specification and answers all queries of A.
Game G1. [Collisions for nonces ri and rH] Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 we abort the simu-
lation in this game if during the interaction ∆ chooses the same random nonce ri resp. rH on behalf of
anyRi resp.H in two different protocol sessions. Considering at most n mesh routers we obtain
|Pr[Winma-h-r
1
]− Pr[Winma-h-r
0
]| ≤ (n+ 1)q
2
2κ
. (5)
Obviously, this game implies that each sidi and sidH remains unique for each invoked session, regardless
of the chosen rM.
Game G2. [Signature forgery for σH] This game is identical to Game G1 with the only exception
that∆ fails ifA asks a Send query to an instance of anyRi containing a valid signature σH not previously
output by an instance ofH.
Assume that ∆ simulates the protocol execution according to the specification except that it is given
access to the signing oracle (representing the algorithm Sig) which it queries in order to obtain the
corresponding signatures σH on behalf of H. In case that the simulation aborts ∆ is in possession of
a valid signature σH which was not obtained through any previous oracle call, and can, therefore, be
returned by ∆ as a corresponding forgery. Hence, |Pr[Winma-h-r
2
]− Pr[Winma-h-r
1
]| ≤ Succeuf-cma(Sig,Ver)(κ).
Since each σH is computed over the corresponding session id sidH and verified by Ri using own
sidi (amongst other inputs) and the session ids are unique according to the previous game, this game
rules out any successful replay attacks for σH. Since verification of σH by each Ri is the necessary
requirement for the acceptance of Ri in SERENA, this game excludes attacks by which A can win based
on the condition (1).
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Game G3. [Aggregate signature forgery for σ¯1..i] In this game the simulator chooses some index
i∗ ∈ [1, n] at random. It then computes secret/public signing/verification keys (ski, vki) for each mesh
router Ri with i 6= i∗ whereas for Ri∗ it gets access to the aggregate signing oracle (representing the
algorithm ASig). The simulation in this game is identical to Game G2 with the only exception that ∆
fails if A asks a Send query containing a valid aggregate signature σ¯1..i∗ to an instance of Ri∗+1 (or to
an instance of H in case that i∗ = n) such that σ¯1..i∗ has not been previously output by the ASig oracle
on behalf of uncorruptedRi∗ . The simulator can easily notice when such a Send query occurs.
In case that the simulation aborts ∆ is in possession of a valid aggregate signature σ¯1..i∗ which was
not obtained through any previous call to ASig, and can, therefore, be returned by ∆ as a corresponding
forgery. Hence,
|Pr[Winma-h-r
3
]− Pr[Winma-h-r
2
]| ≤ nSucceuf-cma(ASig,AVer)(κ). (6)
Since each σ¯1..i is computed over the corresponding session id sidi and the last aggregate signature σ¯1..n
is verified by H using own sidH (amongst other inputs) and the session ids are unique according to the
previous game, this game also rules out any successful replay attack for σ¯1..n. Since verification of σ¯1..n
by H is the necessary requirement for the acceptance of H in SERENA, this game excludes attacks by
which A can win based on the condition (2).
Further, we focus on the attacks based on condition (3). Observe, that due to the inclusion of θp into
the signed message the successful verification of σH by any mesh router Ri implies that Ri must have
computed the same value for θp, and consequently both Ri and H hold identical kp that they use to
compute the path key Kp. Hence, the probability that partnered instances of some mesh router Ri and
H accept with two different path keys in this game is 0, i.e. Pr[Winma-h-r
3
] = 0. Combining the previous
equations, we conclude the proof.
Theorem 4 (p-AKE). Given EUF-CMA secure (Sig, Ver) and (ASig, AVer), a IND-CCA2 secure (Enc,
Dec), and a pseudo-random PRF the protocol SERENA specified in Figure 1 provides p-AKE-security in
the sense of Definition 7, and
Adve-akeSERENA(κ) ≤
2(n+ 2)q2
2κ
+4Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ) + 2Succ
euf-cma
(Sig,Ver)(κ)+
+2nSucceuf-cma(ASig,AVer)(κ) + 2qAdv
ind-cca2
(Enc,Dec)(κ) + 8qAdv
prf
PRF(κ).
Proof. In the following we construct a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, . . . , 7 and denote by Win
p-ake
i
the event that A breaks the p-AKE-security of SERENA in game Gi, i.e., wins in the corresponding
interaction as described in Definition 7.
Game G0. [Real protocol] This is the real Gamep-akeSERENA(κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT
adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the participating M, H, and {Ri}i according to the protocol
specification and answers all queries of A. Recall, that the Test_Kp query is asked by A to a p-fresh
instance of either M, H, or some Ri which has previously accepted. Note in particular, that the no-
tion of p-freshness excludes any corruptions of M, H, and any Ri. In order to prevent A from active
participation on behalf of either of these parties we first exclude possible impersonation attacks.
Game G1. [Collisions for nonces rM, rH, and {ri}i] The simulation in this game aborts (and the
output bit of the interaction is set at random) if the same random nonce is chosen by ∆ on behalf of F ,
M, orH, respectively, in two different protocol sessions. Thus,
|Pr[Winp-ake
1
]− Pr[Winp-ake
0
]| ≤ (n+ 2)q
2
2κ
. (7)
Game G2. [MAC forgeries for µH and µM] The simulation in this game aborts (and the output bit
of the interaction is set at random) if A asks as part of its Send query toM (or to H) a valid MAC value
µH (or µM) which was not previously output by an instance ofH (orM). Obviously,
|Pr[Winp-ake
2
]− Pr[Winp-ake
1
]| ≤ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ). (8)
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The elimination of possible forgeries and replay attacks for µH and µM implies that any accepting
p-fresh instance ofM (orH) has a partnered instance ofH (orM) which is also p-fresh.
Game G3. [Signature forgery for σH] The simulation in this game aborts (and the output bit of the
interaction is set at random) if A asks as part of its Send query to some Ri a valid signature σH which
was not previously output by an instance ofH, so that
|Pr[Winp-ake
3
]− Pr[Winp-ake
2
]| ≤ Succeuf-cma(Sig,Ver)(κ). (9)
The elimination of possible forgeries and replay attacks for σH implies that any accepting p-fresh in-
stance of a mesh routerRi has a partnered instance ofH which is also p-fresh.
Game G4. [Aggregate signature forgery for σ¯1..i] The simulation in this game is identical to Game G3
with the only exception that ∆ chooses an index i∗ ∈ [1, n] such that for the mesh router Ri∗ it obtains
aggregate signatures σ¯1..i∗ through an oracle and aborts the simulation ifA asks a Send query containing
a valid aggregate signature σ¯1..i∗ to an instance of Ri∗+1 (or to an instance of H in case that i∗ = n)
such that σ¯1..i∗ has not been previously output by any call to the oracle.
In case that the simulation aborts ∆ is in possession of a valid aggregate signature σ¯1..i∗ which was
not obtained through any previous call to ASig, and can, therefore, be returned by ∆ as a corresponding
forgery. Hence, |Pr[Winma-h-r
4
]− Pr[Winma-h-r
3
]| ≤ nSucceuf-cma(ASig,AVer)(κ).
The elimination of possible forgeries and replay attacks for any σ¯{1..i} implies that any accepting
p-fresh instance ofH has a partnered instance of eachRi which is also p-fresh.
Games G2, G3, and G4 imply that if at least one p-fresh instance of some protocol party accepts
then there exist partnered instances of all other parties which are also p-fresh.
Game G5. [Pseudo-randomness of Ke] This game is identical to Game G4 except that ∆ in each
session on behalf of any partnered instances ofM and H chooses the end-to-end key Ke as a random
value and not as an output of PRF, s.t. |Pr[Winp-ake
5
]− Pr[Winp-ake
4
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ).
This game ensures independence between the key material k′p that will be used to derive kp, θp,
and finally Kp, and the end-to-end key Ke which may be revealed by A without compromising the
p-freshness of an instance.
Game G6. [Pseudo-randomness of k′p] This game is identical to Game G5 except that ∆ in each
session on behalf of the partnered instances ofM and H chooses k′p as a random value and not as an
output of PRF, s.t. |Pr[Winp-ake
6
]− Pr[Winp-ake
5
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ).
Note that the chosen random value will also be used in the hop-by-hop encryption given by a se-
quence of χn, . . . , χ1.
Game G7. [Security of χi] In order to exclude any information leakage about k′p upon its hop-by-
hop encrypted transmission across the mesh network we consider the following game, in which ∆ in
each session computes each χi as Enceki(β) where β is some randomly chosen value, independent of
k′p. Note that ∆ derives kp, θp, and Kp on behalf of the partnered instances ofM, H, and {Ri}i still
using k′p (and not β). It is possible to construct a distinguisher with given access to the real-or-random
encryption oracle (and the decryption oracle) that is able to useA in this and the previous game to break
the IND-CCA2 security of (Enc, Dec), s.t.
|Pr[Winp-ake
7
]− Pr[Winp-ake
6
]| ≤ qnAdvind-cca2(Enc,Dec)(κ). (10)
Game G8. [Pseudo-randomness of kp and θp] In this game ∆ proceeds as before except that in each
session on behalf of the partnered instances ofM,H, and {Ri}i it chooses kp and θp as two independent
random values and not as an output of PRF. Obviously,
|Pr[Winp-ake
8
]− Pr[Winp-ake
7
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (11)
Game G9. [Pseudo-randomness of Kp] In this final game ∆ proceeds as before except that in each
session on behalf of the partnered instances ofM, H, and {Ri}i it chooses the path key Kp at random
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and not as an output of PRF. Obviously,
|Pr[Winp-ake
9
]− Pr[Winp-ake
8
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (12)
As a result of this game the answer given to A in response to its Test_Kp query to some p-fresh
instance ofM,H, or anyRi is a completely random value, regardless of the chosen bit b. Obviously, the
probability ofA to win in this game is given by the probability of a random guess, i.e. Pr[Wine-ake
9
] = 12 .
The combination of the above equations concludes the proof.
5 Forward Secrecy, Anonymity, and Accounting
SERENA can be extended in a modular way to address forward secrecy, anonymity of mobile devices, and
accounting between the cooperating networks of the same mesh.
Forward Secrecy of End-to-End and Path Keys The common way to achieve forward secrecy, i.e. to
ensure that AKE-security holds even if A gains access to the long-lived keys of participants after their
instances have accepted in the test session, is to derive the key from some ephemeral secret information
which is valid only for one particular session.
Forward secrecy of Ke can be obtained using the classical Diffie-Hellman technique by deriving Ke
from an ephemeral secret gxMxH (where G is a cyclic group of prime order q and xM, xH ∈ Zq), e.g.
as an output of PRFf(gxMxH )(l3|sid) with some randomness extractor f [12]. For this,M and H must
exchange gxM and gxH as part of their first protocol messages. In order to ensure authentication,H and
M must include gxM and gxH into the computation of µH and µM, respectively. The AKE-security of
such Ke would then rely on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem.
Forward secrecy ofKp can be obtained similarly using the Generalized Diffie-Hellman technique [8]
by deriving Kp from gxM(
∏
i xi)xH (where xM, xi, xH ∈ Zq and each xi is chosen by Ri). Note that
in this case there is no need to apply hop-by-hop encryption of k′p so that all computations involving
k′p become obsolete and the key pairs (dki, eki) can be dismissed from the routers’ long-lived keys.
The AKE-security of Kp would then rely on the Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem. Note that
achieving forward secrecy increases the protocol costs and if forward secrecy is required for Ke and Kp
simultaneously then exponents xM and xH should be independent for each of the above techniques.
Anonymity ofM If necessary SERENA can be extended to achieve anonymity ofM and unlinkability
of its sessions simply by encrypting the identityM in the first protocol message using the IND-CCA2
secure encryption scheme (E ,D). Here we assume that H holds own decryption/encryption key pair
(dkH, ekH) as part of its long-lived key, which is already the case as H is one of the networks of the
mesh. This implies that the session id would be computed using the encryption ofM. We remark that
this solution increases the costs by one public key operation for bothM andH.
Accounting between H and Ri In SERENA each mesh router obtains σH computed by H amongst
other parameters on the session id which also includes the identity of each Ri. This signature can be
extended with the time-stamp T and used for the purpose of accounting between H and Ri, e.g. as an
incentive mechanism for the cooperation of mesh routers. Note that since the packets are routed in real-
time, both H and each Ri can independently keep track on the size of the transmitted packets or on the
duration of the session. Further, any signature σ′H computed by H for some time interval [T, T ′] could
serve as a cryptographically protected acknowledgement ofH for the reimbursement ofRi.
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6 Conclusion
The relatively stable routing infrastructure provided by wireless mesh networks offers valuable connec-
tivity service to the mobile clients. In this paper we addressed the remote wireless network access of
a mobile client to its home network inside the same mesh. We refined the classical end-to-end security
approach by the additional concept of path security and argued on its benefits with regard to security and
robustness of the remote session. We formalized new goals using well-known and recognized model for
authentication and key establishment and proposed a provably secure, yet lightweight, round-optimal,
modular and thus extensible, remote network access protocol SERENA that binds the end-to-end pro-
tected application channel to the underlying stable routing path. We also mentioned how SERENA can be
effectively realized via combination of well-known authentication standards IEEE 802.1X, EAP, PANA,
and IPsec.
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